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WESLEY MULHERIN, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
) 
) 
) v. Case No·, 17027 
INGERSOLL.-R.AND COMPANY, ) 
Defendant.-Respondent~ ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a strict liability action instituted by 
Wesley Mulherin for damages caused by accidental activation 
of an air winch manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand Company, 
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL 
This Court by opinion dated May 4, 1981, reversed 
and remanded to the trial court, holding that the defense of 
misuse in a product liability action is to be compared by the 
trier of fact to the product defect and plaintiff's recovery 
diminished by the degree in which his own fault contributed as 
a proximate cause of his injury. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pertinent facts are fully rehearsed in appellant's 
original brief on appeal. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Should the 50 percent cut ... off imposed.upon a 
plaintiff•· s recovery by the Utah. Comparative. Negligence Act, 
§ 78-27-37, Utah Code Ann., (as amended), require that this 
Court impose a similar limitation upon plaintiff'· s ·recovery 
in this action, s·hould plaintiff~·s contributory fault (consti-
tuting the available defenses of misuse or assumption of risk) 
be found by the trier of fact to equal or exceed the action-
able conduct of defendant? 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MANUFACTURERS OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
ARE NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT 
TO THE SAME STANDARDS AS NEGLIGENT 
TORTFEASORS 
Respondent's· brief argues that manufacturers of 
defective products should not be treated differently from other 
parties to tortfeasors. A brief examination of current law and 
the underlying social policies involved reveals that such a con-
tention is totally without merit. 
It is axiomatic that the public policy which resulted 
in judicial adoption of strict liability for defective products 
was one of practicality. (Restatement of Torts 2d, § 402A). 
It was recognized that manufacturers and distributors were pro-
fiting from the sale of both defective and nondefective products. 
At common law, absent a showing of negligence, a manufacturer 
could continue to profit from the sale of its unreasonably dan-
gerous products. That situation differs radically from that of 
a negligent driver who has nothing to gain by causing or allow-
ing his negligence to injure another. This Court and others 
adopting strict liability, therefore, held that a showing a 
product was unreasonably dangerous. and caused harm while being 
used in a normal manner was sufficient to support recovery. 
-3-
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Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601P.2d152 (Utah 1979), expressly 
adopted these doctrines in Utah, 
A problem connnon to all tort actions is that of achiev-
ing inherent fairness in the allocation of fault. The Utah 
legislature addressed this problem in negligence actions by 
its adoption of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act, § 78.-27~37 1 
Utah Code Ann. (as amended). While this provision bars plain,. 
tiff's recovery where his own negligence is equal to or greater 
than the defendants, it must be remembered that in the vast 
majority of ordinary negligence cases the plaintiff has suffered 
damages as well as the defendant. In a products liability case 
it is difficult to conceive of a manufacturer ever being injured. 
The manufacturer not only has no exposure to harm, but it has 
benefited from the sale of the. product~ By adopting a pure compare 
tive standard in the apportionment of fault in a products liability 
action, this Court recognizes the motivating principle behind 
adoption of the strict liability doctrine, which is that one who 
benefits from the sale of the defective product is in the best 
pqsition to prevent or explain the defect and to pay for damages 
resulting from the defect. 
Respondent argues that by adoption of the Utah Product 
Liability Act, § 78..,15~1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. (as amended), the 
legislature demonstrated its intention to treat manufacturers like 
"everyone else''. Even a cursory examination of these statutes 
exhibit a disparity in treatment of a manufacturer and "everyone 
-4-
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else". The Product Liability Act, in§ 78-15-13, provides a 
limitation period of from six to ten years. Any first year law 
student would recognize the difference between this provision 
and limitation periods provided for negligence related actions; 
i.e., one year for actions against governmental entities, two 
years for actions for wrongful death, one to two years for medical 
malpractice and four years for most other negligence actions. 
To argue, as does respondent, that the Product Liability Act 
equalizes technical application of the law of torts among manufac-
turers of defective products and "everyone else" is to ignore 
reality. 
Finally, respondent suggests a hypothetical "chamber 
of horrorstt situation to support its contention that "pure" com-
parative principles should not apply in strict product liability 
actions. A plaintiff who is 40 percent at fault for his injuries 
suffered from an exploding fire hydrant is able, under this Court's 
decision in the instant case, to recover against a defendant 
manufacturer who along with two other defendants is each 20 percent 
at fault in causing plaintiff's injuries. It is difficult to 
imagine such a result from a jury verdict in any context other 
than counsel's imagination. For the sake of argument, however, 
that possibility should be considered. The inequitable nature 
of a result where such a plaintiff, who is only 40 percent respons-
ible for his injury, yet who is unable to recover 60 percent of 
-s-
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his damages because he had the misfortune to look to three defen-
. dants rather than one is obvious~ Who among the defendants in 
such an action is in the best position to prevent and/or assume 
responsibility for that portion of plaintiff "s injuries? The 
governmental entity supported by involuntary tax dollars? The 
contractor why may do only a handful of such installations, and 
relies .upon the product to hold together? It appears obvious 
that the manufacturer who makes and markets thousands of such 
hydrants yearly, reaps profits thereby, and controls the design 
and quality of its product, is in the best position to prevent 
or explain such accidents, and to respond in damages when a dan-
gerous defect and proximate cause have been established; even 
though the plaintiff's own conduct may have contributed in some 
degree to his injury. 
The plain fact is that an astute plaintiff will include 
as parties defendant everyone whose negligence or other liability-
producing conduct (including strict product liability) could con-
ceivably be found by a jury to have contributed to his injury. 
To penalize such a plaintiff by arbitrarily applying a 50 percent 
no-recovery rule when his· fault equals or exceeds that of any 
stri~t liability defendant regardless of findings against other 
defendants would require him to leave out of the action potential 
defendants whose negligent conduct may have contributed to the 
injury, and make an "all-or-nothing" attack on a single product 
-6-
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liability defendant. In that case, the remaining defendant 
would quite naturally point to the missing defendants, and 
juries are notoriously ready to blame those not present. 
By far, the more fair and practical approach is to 
apportion fault among the parties to such a product liability 
action as this on the basis of pure comparative principles as 
to the defective product, as this Court has chosen to do by its 
opinion. Any ordinary negligence claims against other defen-
dants may be handled according to the statute. The alternative 
course urged upon the court by respondent would produce both 
uncertainty, unnecessary risk-taking in the selection of defen-
dants, and inequitable outcomes based upon numbers imposed by 
the jury upon the respective parties' fault. The latter, and 
most serious problem with that approach, is aggravated by Utah's 
current law preventing the jury's being advised of the ultimate 
effect of its apportionment of fault, McGinn v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (1975). 
Respondent's plea for jucicial recognition of a claimed 
similarity between manufacturers of defective products and "every-
one else" whose fault causes injury disregards the fact that 
current product liability law was created to benefit the injured 
plaintiff who could not recover because at the time such manu-
facturers were considered and treated like "everyone else". 
Both the court and legislature determined that there is a differ-
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ence and that such. manufacturing of defective products causing 
injury should not be treated like "everyone else." 
There is indeed a "double standard" which does and shoulci 
apply in such situations. The manufacturer or seller is properly 
liable when its product is proven to be dangerously defective, 
and to have caused injury while being used in a normal manner, 
regardless of negligence. Anyone else must be proven to be 
guilty of negligence. Tli.ose two theories of liability are poles 
apart, and different or "double'' standards obviously apply to 
the plaintiff's burden of proving fault. Since a "double" stand-
ard already exists in the nature of proof required to support 
a cause of action, how can respondent be heard to complain that 
the application of pure comparative principles results in a double 
standard? 
It should be noted that th_e legal doctrine of strict 
liability for defective products in Utah, the available defenses, 
and manner of application of those defenses are all judicially-
created law covering matters to which the legislature has never 
addressed itself. Had the legislature chosen to speak out in 
this field, it should, of course, be heard. Since it has not, 
this Court is entirely free to create the law to apply and direct 
the. manner in which it will apply. The legislative action (and 
inaction} in the field of negligence should in no way be consi-
dered as limiting this Court in its judicial development of 
strict liability. 
-8-
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CONCLUSION 
Strict product liability and negligence actions are 
entirely different creatures, to which different burdens of proof 
and defenses apply. Distinctions between the two are obvious, 
and application of available defenses in different ways arises 
from rational distinction between them. There are substantial 
underlying social, economic and legal justifications for the 
defferences involved, and such distinctions may by no means be 
considered as denials of equal protection. 
This Court's decision stands at the forefront of the 
developing body, of strict liability law, not only in Utah but 
nation-wide. Respondent's attempt to dilute the effect of that 
decision by persuading the Court it really meant something other 
that what it said should not be given serious consideration. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of August, 1981. 
~--~~- -~ ~THURBER ~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
211 East Broadway, Suite 213 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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John L. Young of MOFFAT, WELLING & PAULSEN, Attorneys for Defendan 
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84111 this 11th day of August, 1981. 
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